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Refusals to Supply: Should the French
Rules be Harmonized with
Those of the EEC?
Dominique Braumh*
In this article, Mr. Brault contends that "harmonizing" the French rules
with those of Germany or the EEC is neither desirable nor necessary because
of the disparate economic structures of the EEC Member States and because
the French rules are, as a result of French case law, not as rigid and severe
as their detractorsportray them. Instead, Mr. Brault suggests that inprac-
tice, the national antitrust laws of EEC Member States are becoming "har-
monized" naturally because German and EEC case law have made the
application of apparenty lenient refusals to supply statutes sign~fcantly more
severe.
INTRODUCTION
The prohibition against the imposition of minimum resale prices
by suppliers upon distributors has been a central pillar of French com-
petition policy since the first regulations in this area were established
by laws in 1953 and 1958.' Recently, however, some have begun to
doubt not only the efficacy of the prohibition, but also its utility within
a system for the protection of free competition.
The prohibition against the imposition of either minimum resale
prices or minimum margins is a major component of all laws protecting
competition. The prohibition is stronger in countries with more limited
national markets. Where the competent authorities must be content
with fewer business enterprises and a lessened degree of competition at
* Rapporteur G6n6ral, Commission de la Concurrence (General Director of the French Anti-
trust Commission).
I Decrees No. 53-704 of Aug. 9, 1953 and No. 58-545 of June 24, 1958.
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the production stage, they are driven to rely more on stimulating com-
petition at the level of distribution. The countries whose markets are
rather restricted, such as Ireland and France, thus attach relatively
greater importance to rules safeguarding commercial competition than
do vast economic communities such as the United States.2
The special weight given to the legal prohibition in French law
against the imposition of minimum prices may also have other expla-
nations. One should not forget that it is barely twenty-five years since
the whole of French commerce practiced imposed pricing by suppliers,
and that it is barely four years since nearly all prices were controlled by
the Government. The French tradition historically has been one of
state or private direct control of prices. It is not surprising that current
laws inspired by a concern with liberalizing the French economy give
an eminent place to sellers' freedom to set their resale prices at the
retail level.3
The prohibition in France against price maintenance is, however,
a fragile pillar which is fissured by a system of recommended prices
and the authorities' tolerant attitude in overseeing possibly anticompe-
titive distribution agreements. In addition, of the two principles which
buttress this pillar, only one is relatively solid. Both discriminatory
price and service treatment and outright refusals to supply must be con-
trolled so that suppliers may not punish sellers who disregard "recom-
mended" minimum resale prices. Control of discriminatory treatment,
the first corollary of a prohibition against imposed resale prices, is by
force of circumstance a control of only the most glaring abuses. The
second buttress, a prohibition against refusals to supply, is much more
solid. The rule is easy for businessmen to understand and relatively
easy for the government to enforce.
For several months, however, this prohibition on refusals to supply
has been the subject of a debate in France. Under the pretext that lib-
erty is indivisible, some maintain that a merchant's freedom to set his
prices should also entail the liberty of choosing his clients. These critics
have argued that the French legislation on refusals to supply should be
modified in order to harmonize it with the laws of the other countries
2 The American rule with regard to unilateral refusals to supply by a firm lacking monopoly
power is stated by Justice McReynolds in United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919):
In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the [Sherman] act does not
restrict the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private
business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will
deal. And, of course, he may announce in advance the circumstances under which he will
refuse to sell.
3 See Decrees No. 45-1483 of June 30, 1945 and No. 73-1193 of Dec. 27, 1973 in Appendix I
to this article.
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of the EEC, putting an end to the characteristic peculiarities of the
French law. One should not exaggerate the importance of this debate.
It was initiated by a small number of manufacturers who scarcely rep-
resent the merchandising wing of progressive French industries. These
manufacturers had, for the most part, benefited until the middle of the
1970s from an exemption from the general rule prohibiting price main-
tenance, and no doubt look back at this period with great nostalgia. 4
Nevertheless, this minority is very active. It has successfully gained
support within business circles and parliaments. 5
The reflections which follow challenge the value, if not the sincer-
ity, of the objective of harmonization of this portion of French law, as
well as the premises on which those who pursue this objective appear to
rely.
I. THE VALUE OF HARMONIZING FRENCH COMPETITION LAW
The objective of harmonizing the body of laws and regulations by
which the interior markets of each of the Member States operates cer-
tainly conforms with the obligations undertaken in the body of the
Treaty of Rome,6 and is in the collective interests of industries within
the EEC.
One observes, however, that business circles invoke this objective
in a selective fashion. For example, it surely would be more important
to reconcile the technical norms of or the conditions of entry into cer-
tain businesses than to reconcile the regulations concerning certain
commercial practices, but the call for harmonization is less vociferously
advanced in the former two instances than in the latter.
Be that as it may, one can wonder whether the harmonization of
regulations concerning commercial practices affecting competition is
necessary or even desirable. Those who, like several French manufac-
turers of electric houseware appliances, cite as an enviable model the
legal system of the widespread and homogenous American market, for-
get that each of the fifty states of the United States has an autonomous
body of law concerning these commercial practices, the application of
which is superimposed upon the federal body of law, and that, while
imposed prices are legal in approximately twenty-five of these states,
4 See list of exceptions from the ban on imposed prices, June 15, 1972 in Appendix II to this
article.
5 Bill No. 1650 "To aid competition through the harmonization of our commercial legislation
with that of our partners in the European Community," submitted to the Presidency of the Na-
tional Assembly, Apr. 17, 1980.
6 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11,
at arts. 1-2, 100-02 (entered in force Jan. 1, 1958) [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty].
Refusals to Supply
3:384(1981)
they are proscribed in the rest. But one rarely hears that these dispari-
ties in the body of American competition law have fettered the compet-
itiveness of American enterprises, whether in their own or in export
markets.
After all, the harmonization of laws between countries makes com-
plete sense if the industrial and commercial market structures are ho-
mogenous and the problems to be resolved in each are similar. But in
France this is not the case; the objectives and the priorities of the oppo-
site side of the Rhine are very different. For example, attitudes regard-
ing equality in the ease of entry into the retail market of different forms
of commercial establishments differ greatly. In the Federal Republic of
Germany one recalls with a bit of derision the small shops of "Aunt
Emma," while in France, one restrains the spontaneous evolution of
the market's distribution structure by passing the Royer Law which re-
stricts the establishment of supermarkets.7 Furthermore, commercial
custom and public opinion in these two nations is not the same; a con-
sensus accepting free competition has been attained in the Federal Re-
public of Germany while one is still striving to attain it in France.
Finally, the structure of German commerce is much more concentrated
than that of France; in 1980 independent and traditional stores com-
prised 17.5 percent of gross revenues of the retail trade in Germany, as
compared to approximately 60 percent in France.
The challenge thus is not to make French and German manufac-
turers face a comparable degree of constraint in their choice of distrib-
utors; rather it is to make gross productivity in production and
distribution in France as great as that in the Federal Republic of
Gemany. It is precisely because of the unique traits which characterize
the institutions, the inter-relations and the interaction of businessmen
in France that it would be dangerous to liberalize in France the
prohibitions against refusals to supply.
According to those who wish to recover total liberty in choosing
their clients, the French legislation on refusals to supply is obsolete and
maladapted to modem economic conditions. Formed in the post-war
shortages, the regulations were a law of circumstance. They might
have had some purpose, it is said, at the moment when one had to
protect large scale retail establishments which were in their infancy, but
the regulations would be without significance today. It is further ar-
gued that these regulations would contradict the policy which presently
is employed by the public authorities to restore freedom of enterprise.
7 Law No. 73-1193 of Dec. 27, 1973 concerning commerce and industry, ch. II, at arts. 28-34;
Implementing Decree No. 74-63 of Jan. 28, 1974.
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It is true that the original prohibition against refusals to supply
proceeded historically from a concern with preventing abuses in a pe-
riod of shortages. This prohibition was enacted into law in October
1940.8 It is also true that the restoration of this rule at the end of the
1950s had a totally different purpose, responding to a necessity, much
more evident then than today, of correcting the balance of forces be-
tween manufacturers and sellers, a balance which had become mani-
festly disequilibrated to the detriment of commerce. In this period
there existed in France no hyper-march5s9 and very few supermarkets,
despite the fact that the shortages had ended. It is equally undeniable
that this legislation had been essential for the development in France of
self-service lower-margin stores and that it had constituted a powerful
factor in the development of competition and commercial moderniza-
tion for twenty-two years.
Certainly the purchasing power of some commercial distributors
today has become such that one should protect certain suppliers from
the often exorbitant demands of the largest purchasers. Although one
should better control certain anomalies, discriminatory treatment, ex-
clusive dealing or referral bonuses, it would be simplistic to maintain
that in France today there is an inversion of disequalities in the balance
of commercial contractual relations. In this regard one finds situations
very diverse: some small manufacturers must give in to the abusive
demands of purchasers, but also some distributors are completely tied
by the manufacturers who supply them.
There no longer exists, as in the dawn of the 1960s, a need to cor-
rect a general inequality in commercial relations. In reality, the princi-
ple of prohibition of refusals to supply continues to correspond to the
specific needs of the French economy. It is far from being anachronis-
tic and has not lost its meaning. For consumers it is one of the guaran-
tees that there will be no return to the regime of imposed minimum
prices, which for a long time deprived consumers of the advantages of
competition in the market.
It remains particularly necessary to react against refusals to supply
by suppliers who oppose discount retailers. The French Antitrust
Commission has on several occasions taken notice that the traditional
retailers pressure producers to cease supplying those shopkeepers who
offer consumers the choice of new marketing techniques or advanta-
8 Law of Oct. 21, 1940, modifying, completing and codifying price legislation, J.O.R.F., Nov.





On closer examination, the idea of harmonizing legal constraints is
itself debatable. If there were to be a harmonization, it would not be
limited to regulations against the practice of refusing to supply. One
should not forget that in effect the prohibition against refusals to supply
is a corollary of that on imposed resale prices; the other corollary
prohibitions against discriminatory treatment must also be considered,
since this practice can also be used by a supplier to sanction a
merchant's disregard of the supplier's pricing norms which are "recom-
mended" or imposed.
Harmonization might also apply to the regulations applicable to
certain forms of selective price reductions, since sales at a loss and,
under certain conditions, the practice of "loss leader" pricing are be-
hind suppliers' motives for refusing to supply.
French manufacturers and their networks of traditional retailers in
this regard could regret the loss of certain protections as a result of
harmonization, such as that provided by the Law of 1963 concerning
resales at a loss, which are actually unique to French legislation.
II. FRENCH LEGISLATION ON THE REFUSAL TO SUPPLY IS NOT AS
UNIQUE AS CLAIMED
Assuming that the need is recognized for harmonization, if not
unification, of the legislative rules relating to the refusal to supply,
which model should be used to implement the desired harmonization?
Is the Italian model preferable which does not have any regulation con-
cerning the refusal to supply? Manufacturers or corporate attorneys
who challenge the French legislation suggest the German model. To
them, the German law seems to strike a just balance, because refusals
to supply are not reprehensible in the Federal Republic of Germany
except where they constitute an abuse.
Is the French legislation on the refusal to supply truly more for-
malistic and rigid than other legislation, as certain people hold it to
be? 1 A rapid comparison of the different legal systems applicable to
this commercial practice, the evolution which has characterized them
and the conditions in which these systems are realistically applied, ac-
10 Opinions of the Antitrust Commission: Concerted practices between suppliers and distribu-
tors of electric household and acoustic goods, BULLETIN OFFICIEL DES SERVICES DES PRIX
(B.O.S.P.) (Feb. 9, 1980); Anticompetitive concerted practices in the furniture market, B.O.S.P.
(Jan. 16, 1981).
11 Ferrand, La Concurrence de Griboulle, LE MONDE (Feb. 9, 1980).
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tually leads to the conclusion that the differences are merely formal and
are tending to diminish over time.
A. France
The system concerning prices instituted in France under Article
37(l)(a) of the Ordinance of June 30, 1945,12 contains a general prohi-
bition on refusals to supply, but it is accompanied by important excep-
tions. The cases in which refusal to supply is legitimate are numerous,
principal among them being cases in which suppliers face "abnormal
demand." Periodically, ministerial circulars, such as those to which M.
Fontanet attached his name in 1960,'1 M. Fourcade in 1970,14 Mine.
Scrivener in 197815 and M. Monory in 1980,16 enlarged the notion of
"abnormal demand." The Administration also instructed its regional
offices of control not to commence legal investigations except in cases
of abuse.
Exceptions to the prohibition on refusals to supply have not been
limited solely to the illustrations on "abnormal demand" enumerated
in the ministerial circulars. The courts have also developed a body of
jurisprudence in this area. The restrictive conditions imposed by the
Cour de Cassation in the Brandt7 decision of 1962 for finding a recip-
rocal exclusive dealing agreement legitimate, thus making the product
legally unavailable and consequently legitimating a refusal to supply a
non-franchisee, are not followed by the courts except in exceptional
circumstances. Selective distribution practices are exempted from real
control with respect to the law on refusals to supply. In other words, in
France refusals to supply currently are endorsed by the law, and this
practice is not investigated or prosecuted except in a small number of
cases of abuse: only forty-five legal investigations for refusals to supply
were commenced in 1979, and thirty-one in the course of the first se-
mester in 1980. In fact, the French system of preventing and repressing
refusals to supply rests upon a principle of controlling abuses, and it is
not more draconian than that offered as an example by its detractors,
12 See note 3 supra.
13 Circular of Mar. 31, 1960 concerning the prohibition of commercial practices restricting
competition (Fontanet circular), [1960] J.O.; [1960] D. JUR.
14 Circular of May 30, 1970 concerning certain measures enhancing competition, [1970] J.O.;
[1970] D.S. JUR.
15 Circular of Jan. 10, 1978 concerning commercial relations between firms, [1978] J.O.; [1978]
D.S. JUR.
16 Circular of Sept. 22, 1980, B.O.S.P. (Sept. 24, 1980).
17 Judgment of July 11, 1962, Cour de Cassation, city; Cass. crim. Fr., [1962] D. Jur. 497.
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who favor notably the German system or the EEC standard based on
the Treaty of Rome.
B. Germany
Although reference to the German system is fashionable, critics
rarely examine the actual operation of the German regulations. Price
and service discrimination, of which the least visible and thus most uti-
lized form is the refusal to supply, is not the subject of a regulation
which, like Article 37 of the French Ordinance of June 30, 1945,18 is
applicable by itself regardless of the economic context. Nevertheless,
the principle of contractual liberty, by virtue of which a manufacturer
is free to choose his customers, is giving way-step by step-to the de-
mands of competition policy, so that the system applicable to the refus-
als to supply on the other side of the Rhine in effect approaches that
which prevails in France.
Until 1976, section 26 of the German Act Against Restriction of
Competition' 9 did not permit the prosecution of refusals to supply ex-
cept when they were the act of an enterprise in a dominant position, or
a concerted practice in the form of a boycott.
In 1976 the law was amended to allow for the restraint of discrimi-
natory practices and refusals to supply by individual enterprises, not
only those in dominant positions in their markets, but also those pos-
sessing a relative power in the market (relative macht) where their
products, even if not representing an important part of the market, are
in effect indispensable to their clients.
From now on, the majority of the German manufacturers of prod-
ucts of known brands are obliged to reconsider before refusing to fill an
order. They can, certainly, refuse to supply a customer, but in the
event of litigation, they must justify this stance, proving, for example,
that they legitimately practice a qualitative selection, or even in certain
cases a quantitative selection, of their distributors or that they are tied
by exclusive dealing agreements, all of which are under judicial con-
trol. The provisions of section 26 were applied one hundred times in
1979.
Section 18 of the German Act Against Restriction of Competition
permits the Bundeskartellamt to enjoin a manufacturer to renew deliv-
eries if it establishes the existence of abusive refusals to supply, even
though the manufacturer possesses neither a dominant market position
18 See note 3 supra.
19 See Excerpts of 1957 German law modified concerning restrictions on competition, restric-
tive and discriminatory behavior, in Appendix III to this article.
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nor relative macht. The Bundeskartellamt used this power fifteen to
twenty times in 1979. One should add that a new amendment to the
German law is being prepared for the purpose of better specifying rep-
rehensible cases of discrimination and refusals to supply. German
commercial circles demanded this legislative reform to complete and
reinforce the legal suppression of discriminatory practices.
One therefore sees that in practice, despite differences which exist
as to the burden of proof, the laws affecting French and German manu-
facturers with respect to refusals to supply are not as different as some
allege.
C European Economic Community
The rules of the EEC Treaty, also presented as a model to be fol-
lowed, are in appearance, as are those of West Germany, much less
systematic and more permissive than those of the French law. But as in
West Germany, they are the object of an increasingly strict application.
Several years ago, a refusal to supply would not violate the Com-
munity law unless it was the deed of an enterprise in a dominant posi-
tion and resulted in a grave harm to competition.20 In the Commercial
Solvents Corporation case, also known as the Zoja case, the Commis-
sion in 1972 condemned a refusal to supply and imposed a fine of
200,000 units of account.21 This was then about five times the maxi-
mum penal fine provided in this matter in French law. Although the
Court of Justice reduced this sanction to 100,000 units of account, it
also enjoined Commercial Solvents to resume deliveries, under penalty
of contempt.22
In the United Brands decision in 1975, a decision confirmed by the
Court of Justice, the Commission condemned a refusal without a legiti-
mate motive to deliver bananas to a Danish client.23 In 1977, the Com-
mission found that an enterprise could, under certain conditions,
dominate its clients without dominating its market. This finding con-
20 Such a course of conduct may be attacked as an abuse of a dominant position under Article
86 of the EEC Treaty, note 6 supra.
21 Commission Decision of Dec. 14, 1972, 15 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 299) 51 (1972), [1973]
Comm. Mkt. L.R. D50.
22 Instituto Chemioterapico Italiana Spa & Commercial Solvents Corps. v. Commission,
[1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 232, [1974] 1 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 309.
23 Commission Decision of Dec. 17, 1975 Relating to a Proceeding under Article 86 of the
EEC Treaty, 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 95) 1, 2 (1976), [1976] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D28, D32,
application for stay granted sub. nom United Brands Co. v. Commission, [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 425, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 147, modXed, [1978] 1 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 429.
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siderably enlarges the field of possibilities for applying the competition
rules of the EEC Treaty to refusals to supply.
That same year the Commission extended the notion of abuse of
dominant position in censuring refusals to supply. In the Hugin-Lipton
case the Commission determined that, even if Hugin had not held a
dominant position in the cash register market, a separate market ex-
isted for supplying replacement parts for the maintenance and repair of
the cash registers of this brand.24 Furthermore, the Commission deter-
mined that a refusal to supply the replacement parts to a qualified ven-
dor of the cash registers without a valid reason was a sanctionable
refusal to supply, and enjoined Hugin to resume its deliveries to Lipton
under penalty of a fine of 1,000 units of account per day, as well as
imposing a fine of 50,000 units of account.
On January 10, 1980, the Commission was given the power to take
preventive measures for enforcing the provisions of Articles 85 and 86
of the Treaty of Rome. The Commission can now enjoin a supplier to
make deliveries to a distributor* under penalty of fines, even if both
parties are from the same Member State, if irreparable harm would
result in the absence of this measure and commerce between the Mem-
ber States could be affected by the refusal to supply.
In Brussels, the Commission is preparing to define the conditions
of an allowable selective distribution, and there are reasons to expect
that the right of suppliers to refuse to supply certain distributors will be
less widely recognized in the future.
Finally, one can note that refusals to supply are often punished in
Brussels with a rigor unknown in the enforcement of French law. For
example, the Commission imposed a fine of twenty-five million francs
on the company manufacturing Pioneer electro-acoustical equipment,
for refusals to supply. This was one hundred times the sanction im-
posed by M. Monory upon the exclusive importer of this brand into
France-Musique Diffusion Francaise-for its participation in con-
certed practices in the houseware appliance sector.25
Thus, it is remarkable that while competition in distribution is
much more developed in Germany than in France, the German system
for controlling refusals to supply is becoming progressively more rigor-
ous than its French counterpart. It is not less remarkable that the ap-
plication of the EEC Treaty to refusals to supply is also evolving
24 Commission Decision of Dec. 8, 1977, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 22) 23 (1978), rev'dsub.
nora. Hugiss Kassaregister A.B. v. Commission, [19791 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1869, [1979] 3
Comm. Mkt.- L. 1. 345 (finding no effect on trade between member states).
25 Commission Decision of Dec. 14, 1979, 23 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 60) 21 (1980).
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toward stricter control, even though the attention given to protection of
commercial competition appears to be lessened in vast markets. In this
context, it appears that it would slow down the spontaneous process of
the harmonization in progress to bend the French law in an opposite
direction.
In the end, the differences between the system of controlling refus-
als to supply adopted in Germany or in the EEC, on the one hand, and
those in France on the other, are more apparent than real. The differ-
ences rest essentially on the severity of the burden of proof. The
French supplier who objects to seeing his products sold as "loss lead-
ers," for example, must be able to justify a refusal to supply by showing
the abnormal character of demand or the bad faith of the demai~der.
On the contrary, in the system advocated by the proponents of legal
reform, the retailer who is the object of a refusal to supply must prove
his good faith in order to be supplied again.
III. CONCLUSION
Upon reflection, one is led to very different conclusions from those
the advocates of freedom in refusing to supply have urged upon the
public authorities in France. In fact, if one recognizes that: a) the dif-
ferent legislative systems should be compared according to their en-
forcement practices rather than the formal differences in language;
b) the enforcement of regulations on the refusal to supply approaches,
in France as elsewhere, a simple control of abuses in this practice; and
c) a degree of harmonization is spontaneously evolving around this no-
tion of controlling abuses, resulting in the increasing flexibility in en-
forcement in France occurring alongside increasing rigor in other
legislative systems; then one arrives at the conclusion that modification
of the French law on refusals to supply in order to make it conform
more closely to the legislative models which explicitly pursue only
cases of abuse, is far from being a necessity. As a result, one wonders
whether this proposition of legislative reform is not inspired by pur-
poses less altruistic than that of harmonizing the laws within the Euro-
pean Economic Community.
One cannot be insensitive to the campaign which is being ad-
vanced today by certain French manufacturers for liberalizing the
prohibitions on the refusal to supply. One cannot but approve the ob-
jective, sought by manufacturers of well-known brands, of exercising
certain resale rights to ensure the quality of their products to the ulti-
mate consumer. What is objectionable, however, is the method chosen
for effecting this resale right: namely the freedom of refusing to supply.
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It would be dangerous to place in the hands of all manufacturers so
absolute a weapon, one of which only a few can be in need, on the
condition that the uses to which it could be put be closely controlled.
This would reinstate the disequilibrium in the balance of power in
favor of manufacturers which existed before 1960. This would en-
courage the tendency, which is evident today in a large part of French
commerce, to moderate the free play of effective competition.
In order not to proceed in a way contrary both to these needs and
to competition policy, one must view competition law less as a restraint
on enterprises than as a stimulus for innovation and competitiveness.
More responsive alternatives exist to counter the genuine instances of
"loss leader" pricing which is so frequently put forward by suppliers as
justifying refusals to supply. One could also usefully define the condi-
tions and the limits of selective distribution. This implies reconciling
several contradictory demands: assuring manufacturers a minimum of
control over their products up to the end of the product's distribution
chain if their product's characteristics justify it, not excessively limiting
the freedom of merchants to distribute their products and set their
prices, and finally, seeing that French consumers not bear excessively
the costs of national market control, thanks to which the conquest of
external markets takes place.
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APPENDIX 1*
Article 37, Decree No. 45-1483 of June 30, 1945:
37. It shall be deemed to be an offense liable to the same penalties as
illegal practices in connection with prices:
1. For any producer, person engaged in industry or craftsman:
(a) to retain products intended for sale by refusing to satisfy to the best
of his ability the demands of purchasers, or to refuse to satisfy to the
best of his ability, demands for services, provided that such demands
are in no way abnormal and that the sale of the products or the supply
of the services is not prohibited by a special regulation of the public
authority...
4. For any person to establish, maintain or impose a minimum
price upon his products and the furnishing of services, or upon service
commissions such as by the means of price lists or scales of charges, or
as a result of a similar understanding.
Paragraph 4 above does not apply to cases in which the products
or services will have been made by a special exception negotiated
jointly by a minister charged with power in economic affairs, a minister
charged with power in commercial affairs and other interested minis-
ters. Such exceptions which in all cases must be limited with respect to
time, may be given particularly in the case of new products or services,
in connection with a patent licensing, a trademark licensing or the re-
quirements of book charges which are related to quality and special
packaging, or the publicity campaign in connection with the launching
of a new product.
Article 37, Decree No. 73-1193 of Dec. 27, 1973:
It is prohibited for any dealer, person engaged in industry or
craftsman:
1. To use prices or discriminatory conditions of sale which are
not justified by corresponding differences in the cost of the required
materials or of the service;
* Translation of Appendices I, II and HI by the Staff of the Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business
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2. To deal directly or indirectly, with respect to all retailers,
fraudulently with regard to any matter in paragraph 1 above, or with
respect to gifts of merchandise or money, or the furnishing of free serv-
ices. Every producer is required to convey to all retailers who request
it, his printed table of prices and conditions of sale.
Northwestern Journal of
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LIST OF EXCEPTIONS FROM THE BAN ON IMPOSED PRICES,
JUNE 15, 1972.
3:384(1981)
Authorized Date of Expiration
Beneficiary Products or Services Rebates Decree B.O.S.P.* Date"
Moulinex Electric food n*25.859 3.17.71
processors 15% Of and 9.17.72
Vacuum cleaners 15% o an2 .72
Electric roasters
Rossignol Skis (Roc.550) n°25.862
(Roc.520) 7% of 5.19.71 5.19.73
(Strato) 4.21.71
Dynastar Skis (M.V. 2) n*25.836(S.V) 7% of 5.19.71 5.19.73(S.430) 4.21.71
n'25.864
Le Trappeur Ski footwear 7% of 5.19.71 5.19.73
4.21.71
n°25.865
Heschung et Cie Ski footwear 7% of 5.19.71 5.19.73
4.21.71
n°25.866
Francois Salomon Ski bindings 7% of 5.19.71 5.19.73
et fls 4.21.71
n°25.867
Look Ski bindings 7% of 5.19.71 5.19.73
4.21.71
Some manufacturers Perfume products
of perfume products with the exception of Perfumes
cologne, toilet and n*25.914
lavender water with of 9.17.71 3.17.73




Calor Washing machines n025.908 10.14.71
(50.02-50.04 15% of and 4.14.73
and 50.12) 10.4.71 3.15.72
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Authorized Date of Expiration
Beneficiary Products or Services Rebates Decree B.O.S.P. Date
n
0 25.915
Soci6t6 Superfryer SEB 15% of 10.14.71 4.14.73
d'Emboutissage de Minute-grill SEB 10.4.7 1
Bourgogne S.E.B.
Arthur-Martin Kitchen appliances
Washing machines 10% n*72-14/P




Thomson-Houston- Kitchen appliances n 0 72-15/P
Hotchkiss-Brandt Washing machines 15% of 4.12.72 10.12.73
Refrigerators 4.10.72
* B.O.S.P.: Bulletin Officiel des Services des Prix, an official publication of the Ministry.
** Most of these expiration dates have been renewed for many years.
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APPENDIX III
EXTRACTS FROM THE AMENDED GERMAN LAW OF 1957 RELATING TO
RESTRICTIONS OF COMPETITION: RESTRICTIVE AND DISCRIMINATORY
BEHAVIOR.
Article 25
(1) Any concerted action on the part of enterprises or associations of
enterprises which, according to the present law may not be made the
object of a contractual agreement is forbidden.
(2) It is forbidden for enterprises and associations of enterprises to
threaten other enterprises with injury or to cause injuries or to promise
other enterprises or to bestow upon them such favorable treatment or
to induce them to adopt practices which according to the present law or
to a decision of the appropriate authorities in control of such under-
standings pursuant to the present law may not be made the object of a
contractual agreement.
(3) It is forbidden for enterprises or associations of enterprises to re-
quire other enterprises:
(1) To adhere to an agreement or a decision as defined in Article 2(a),
Article 29, Article 99(2), Article 100(1) and (7), Article 102 and Article
103;
(2) To join with other enterprises as defined in Article 23; or
(3) To adopt a similar attitude in the market with the purpose of re-
straining commerce.
Article 26
(1) It is forbidden for enterprises or associations of enterprises to in-
duce another enterprise or association of enterprises to refuse deliveries
or to boycott certain purchases in favor of other enterprises with the
intent of causing unfair injury to specific competitors in the market.
(2) It is forbidden for enterprises occupying a dominant position in
the market and for associations of enterprises as defined in Articles 2
through 8, Article 99(2), Article 100(1) through (7), Articles 102 and
103, as well as for enterprises which impose their prices in the sense of
Articles 16, 100(3) or 103(1) (no. 3), to hamper in any unfair manner
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directly or indirectly another enterprise in the normal conduct of its
business relations which would be expected of similar businesses, or to
apply directly or indirectly a discriminatory system with respect to
businesses similar to itself without objectively justifiable reasons. The
first sentence also applies to enterprises and associations of enterprises
which are subsidiaries of suppliers or of buyers of certain types of prod-
ucts or commercial services to the extent that there is not a sufficient
number of reasonable possibilities for [such enterprises and associa-
tions of enterprises] to apply themselves to other enterprises.
